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Abstract 
Mobile ad-hoc network is an infrastructure-less and self-organizing network, where nodes communicate through wireless links. 
Because of its dynamic topology, security becomes a vital issue compared to infrastructure networks. MANETs are more 
vulnerable to various types of security attacks due to the absence of trusted centralized authority. Several routing protocols have 
been proposed for these networks to establish an end to end link for communication between the nodes. These protocols are 
prone to attacks by the malicious nodes and there is always a need to detect and prevent the attacks timely before the collapse of 
network. In this paper the focus lies on current routing attacks, security issues of ad-hoc networks and solutions to mitigate 
attacks against the routing protocols based on cooperation between nodes in network. 
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1. Introduction 
A set of autonomous wireless nodes communicating together to form a network is referred as Mobile Ad-hoc 
Network. It’s a self-configured and decentralized system as the nodes in the network are in mobility, and connect to 
various networks through wireless connections, hence the topology of the network changes rapidly and 
unpredictably over time. An Ad-hoc network [1] communication can be a standard Wi-Fi connection, or other 
medium, such as satellite or cellular transmission. Few Ad-hoc networks are restricted to the local area of wireless 
devices like a group of laptops, mobiles while the rest are connected to the internet. Due to the high mobility and 
dynamic in nature they are typically not secured, so it’s important to be very cautious in MANETs while the data 
transmission. The example architecture of MANET is shown in below figure 1. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. MANET Architecture 
Major applications of MANETs is  establishing survivable, efficient and dynamic communication[1] in 
emergency and rescue operations, at times of disasters, military battlefields,  personal area network and in 
commercial sector. Such network establishments cannot rely on centralized and wired connectivity. 
1.1. Security Issues in MANETs 
Currently research in security [2] is an essential requirement among all the research issues in MANET 
environments. Compared to wire networks, MANETs are more vulnerable to security attacks due to lack of trusted 
centralized authority, when compared to wire networks, easy eavesdropping due to shared wireless medium, 
dynamic network topology, low bandwidth, and battery and memory constraints of mobile devices. In the group 
communication the more challenging issue is security of MANETs due to the presence of multiple senders and 
receivers. 
2. Protocols for Routing in MANETs 
Routing protocols in MANETs are classified into three types they are:  
x Proactive (or) Table-Driven Routing Protocols 
x Reactive (or) On-Demand Routing Protocols 
x Hybrid Routing Protocols 
2.1. Proactive (or) Table-Driven Routing Protocols 
In proactive routing protocols every node maintains one or more routing information tables to every other node 
over the network. As the topological changes [12] occur the nodes propagate updated messages to all the nodes of 
the network to maintain updated and consistent routing information of the entire network. When the updated 
messages are shared across the network all the corresponding routing tables are updated. Some of the proactive 
protocols are: Destination-Sequenced Distance- Vector (DSDV) routing, Clustered Gateway Switch Routing 
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(CGSR), Wireless Routing Protocol (WRP), Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) and The Fisheye State Routing 
(FSR). 
2.2. Reactive (or) On-Demand Routing Protocols 
As in proactive routing protocols, the updated routing information is not maintained at every node; instead the 
routes are created on demand when required. Source invokes the route discovery technique to find a path to the 
destination, when it wants to send a packet. This route remains valid as long as the destination is reachable or it is no 
longer required. Reactive routing protocols [1] include: Dynamic Source Routing (DSR), Ad-hoc On-Demand 
Distance Vector (AODV) routing, Temporally Ordered Routing Algorithm (TORA) and Associatively Based 
Routing (ABR). 
2.3. Hybrid Routing Protocols 
These protocols are combined with the features of both the proactive and reactive protocols, in which the routes 
nearby (maximum two hops) are kept up-to date proactively and longer routes, are set up reactively. Under these 
circumstances both the protocols such as proactive and reactive are inefficient. Hybrid protocols [12] include: Zone 
Routing Protocol (ZRP), Zone based Hierarchical Link State (ZHLS) routing protocol. 
3. Vulnerabilities of MANET 
Vulnerability is a weakness in security system. Wireless ad-hoc networks are more vulnerable than wired 
networks. Few of the vulnerabilities [2] of MANETs are:  
3.1. Absence of Centralized Management 
The absence of centralized management makes identifying the attacks [5] over the network is very difficult; it is 
not easy to observe the traffic in dynamic environments.  
3.2. Resource Availability 
The availability of resources is a major issue in MANET. In dynamic environments secure communication leads 
to the elaboration of various security schemes [5]. 
3.3. Scalability 
A major concern regarding security, due to mobility networking of nodes varies all the time. Security [5] 
mechanisms need to provide security for large and small networks as well. 
3.4. Cooperativeness 
Routing algorithms proposed for routing in MANETs assumes all the nodes over the network are cooperative and 
non-malicious [5]. As a result of this attackers can become a crucial routing agent and disturb entire functionalities 
of the network. 
3.5. Dynamic Topology 
High mobility and dynamic topology [5] disturbs the trust relation among the nodes. Sometimes trust may be 
disturbed because of some compromised nodes. The security mechanisms like adaptive and distributed protects the 
dynamic behavior.  
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3.6. Limited Power Supply 
Considering their limited power capability by the MANETs stations, which will be the cause of several threats? A 
station exhibit selfishness and does not cooperate in packet forwarding [5].  
3.7. Bandwidth Constraint 
The links with low capacity are susceptible of interference effects, noise and signal reduction [5]. 
3.8. No Predefined Boundary 
Physical boundaries are cannot be defined precisely in MANETs. So an attacker [5] can intrude into the network 
in the medium range of a node, and can exchange information with the node. 
4. MANET Routing Attacks 
An attacker can engage continuously sensing the network traffic; themselves intrude into the path between the 
source and destination and take over the control of traffic flow over the network [12]. For example, as shown in the 
fig 2(a) and (b), M a malicious node can make itself entering into the routing path between sender S and receiver R. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Routing attack 
Routing attacks and packet forwarding attacks are the network layer vulnerabilities in MANETs. Routing attack is 
an action of advertising routing updates without following the specifications of the routing protocols. The behavior 
of the attack is related to a specific routing protocol used. The malicious routing nodes [12] attack MANET in 
various ways, in the below section issues of routing attacks and their defense methods to mitigate routing attacks on 
MANET. 
Types of Routing Attacks 
4.1. Routing Table Overflow Attack 
In this, routes to nonexistent nodes to legitimate nodes are created by routing algorithms [12]. It’s a proactive 
routing mechanism; it updates routing information at regular intervals. This attack advertises excessive routes to 
overflow the target systems routing table information. It targets that creation of new routes and their implementation 
is prevented due the presence of enough routes and protocol is overwhelmed.  
4.2. Routing Table Poisoning Attack 
Route table information of nodes in the networks is corrupted by the route table poisoning attacker, which lead to 
the creation of false routes. Poisoning of routing table information can be done in following ways: 
x Broadcasting [12] false traffic and creates false entries in the routing tables of other nodes. 
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x Generating RREQ packets with a high priority sequences resulting in deletion of routes with low sequence 
numbers that are legitimate.  
4.3. Packet Replication 
Replication of stale packets by an adversary node [12], consuming extra bandwidth, battery resources available to 
the nodes, and causing unnecessary confusion in routing process. 
4.4. Rushing Attack 
Protocols using duplicate suppression process at the time of route discovery are vulnerable to this attack [3]. 
Route Request packet received by an adversary node form source floods the packet over network before the nodes 
which also received the same react. Because of which node that receives original Route Request packet assume the 
received packets are duplicates and discard the packets. Source node route discovery to find a route would contain an 
adversary node as the intermediate nodes. Hence it would not be possible for the source node to find the secure 
routes, without adversary nodes. 
4.5. Routing Cache Poisoning Attack 
Routing table update done promiscuously Routing cache poisoning attack [12] uses the advantage of it and 
attacks. It takes place when stored information at the routing tables is deleted, modified or injected with wrong 
information. 
5. Advanced attacks 
5.1. Flooding Attack 
It paralyze entire network by depleting the network resources like bandwidth, battery of nodes. Tools like radio 
jamming and battery exhaustion methods are used to conduct this attack [7].  
x A massive bogus route request (RREQ) packet flooding is initiated by the attackers that are rebroadcasted again 
and again by the other nodes. Bogus packet – a packet that consist the destination address which does not exist on 
the network. Because of which the entire network will be flooded leading to the depletion [2] of network 
resources.  
x Similar to the RREQ flooding, a malicious node [7] does data flooding too.  After the path establishment to all 
the nodes on the network, the attacker node sends garbage data packets to them.  
5.2. Sleep Deprivation Attack 
A node or a collection of nodes, targeted by flooding of packets whose resources need to be exhausted. Target 
node is forced to use its major resources like bandwidth, battery and sending false requests to other nodes on the 
network [2]. Because of which it couldn’t be able to process the request coming from legitimate nodes. Due to this 
the life time of genuine node is decreased by wasting its resources. As a result the attacked node will not be able to 
involve itself in routing and become unreachable to other nodes of the network.  
5.3. Blackhole Attack 
Absorbing the information by a node passing through it without forwarding to the destination, due to the dropping 
of packets retransmission [5] need is increased causing congestion on the network. Network working is tempered by 
a blackhole attacker in the following ways: 
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x Route request packets received at the blackhole node intended for a specific destination, it modifies the route 
reply packet with high priority sequence number, to mislead the destination.  
x Source is advertised with a false route reply packet, regarding the optimal path to the destination.  
5.4. Rushing Attack 
The attacker forwards RREQ packets quicker than the authorized nodes, to become a hop in the target node path 
and gain the access to the forwarding group [3]. It increases that the routes discovered will consists the attacker in 
the path. Following are the ways to perform rushing attack: 
x Neighboring nodes are flooded with bogus RREQ packets so as to decrease the processing speed of neighboring 
nodes and improves its flooding speed. 
x By transmitting the RREQ packets [3] at higher transmission power compared to other nodes, to decrease the 
number of hops required to reach the destination.  
5.5. Impersonation Attack 
No authentication mechanism is adapted over networks for joining of nodes. Taking the identity of trusted node 
adversary nodes joins the network causing impersonation [13] and damages the authentication constraint of the 
network. At the same time attacker or adversary node spreads fake routing information and gains access to 
confidential data of genuine nodes and becomes a legitimate node on the network. Impersonation can be made by 
guessing the authorized node identity or disabling authentication mechanisms.  
5.6. Resource Consumption Attack 
One of the most crucial parameter of the nodes over the network is Energy. To conserve energy by the devices the 
transmission need to be done only when it’s absolutely necessary. Send unnecessary route requests to the victim 
nodes[4] to consume the battery life. The normal functionalities of the network are disrupted by an attacker, it’s also 
known as sleep deprivation attack. 
5.7. Location Disclosure Attack 
Disclosing of information by the malicious node about the location or structure of the network and this 
information is used for further attacks [2]. Route map, information about the nodes and their location on the target 
route is collected by the attacker, which is used to analyze the traffic on the network, an unsolved security attack.  
6. Mitigation Techniques of routing attacks 
6.1. Secure Efficient Ad-hoc Distance Vector (SEAD) 
SEAD was developed based on Destination Sequence Distance Vector (DSDV) and includes One-Way Hash 
function [2] to authenticate the mechanism of route updating and to provide security in routing [8]. It’s much easier 
to provide security to the on demand protocols than the table driven protocols.  Distance vector protocols hold the 
hop count value and next hop as the route information. Hash functions are used to incorporate neighbor 
authentication. Due to the larger sequence number the attacker cannot create valid routes. Even with the use of hash 
functions to provide authentication, by tunneling the packets and retransmitting them from one location to other, 
called as wormhole attack. All packets go around the network instead of reaching the destination in the wormhole 
attack. Compromised nodes acts like destination in the process of route discovery to snoop the identity of the 
destination which can lead to route destruction. Blackhole attack [5] is made possible by a compromised node 
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advertising the shortest paths to non-existing nodes on the network. Static table driven protocols are much prone to 
security threats, by tunneling and DOS attacks [8].  
6.2. Ariadne 
Authentication between the nodes is done by using MACs and shared keys and time stamps for packet life time. 
Due to the implementation of time stamping Ariadne prevents spoofing attacks. Compromised nodes make possible 
of Wormhole attacks in Ariadne [8]. Loops in the routes are avoided due to the use of source routes, because of 
which a packet passing by legitimate nodes will not be forwarded into loops.  
6.3. Secure Routing Protocol (SRP)  
Analysis of security is made similar to Ariadne as it’s based on DSR protocol. The frequency of queries received 
from neighbors [8] is measured by the nodes taking part in the discovery process of route and maintain a priority 
ranking inversely proportional to the query rate. So the least priority is assigned to the malicious nodes taking part in 
the network.  
6.4. Authenticated Routing for Ad-hoc Network (ARAN)  
In ARAN node and neighbor authentication is made using public key cryptography and a centralized certification 
authority in route discovery. Due to the neighbor node authentication malicious nodes cannot initiate attacks [8]. 
Compromised nodes can make possible of denial of service attacks. Unnecessary route requests are broadcasted by 
the participating nodes over the network due to which an attacker can cause congestion in the network there by 
compromising the functionality of the network. With the usage of node level signatures spoofing attacks are 
prevented in ARAN. A private key is used to authenticate each packet in the network before it’s broadcasted to the 
next level and verified for authentication. The participation of malicious nodes in any type of attacks is restricted due 
to the strong cryptographic features implemented in ARAN [8]. It’s prone to tunneling and wormhole attacks. With 
implementation of node level signatures the attacks like table overflow and blackhole are impossible in ARAN.  
6.5. Secure Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing (SAODV) 
A strong security featured protocol widely used in industry. In routing [2] it implements central key management, 
to authenticate at node level it uses digital signatures and to mitigate altering node counts a hash chain is used. With 
the help of two compromised nodes tunneling attack is made possible. In any ad-hoc network topology wormhole 
attacks are possible at anytime in the network [8]. Most of the reply attacks can be prevented with use of sequence 
numbers. 
7. Conclusion 
The emergence of the mobile ad-hoc networks is a result of the increasing need for the users to get connected 
with the world anytime and anywhere. The mobility and open media nature of mobile ad-hoc networks exposes it to 
different types of security risks (such as DOS, intrusion etc,) thereby emphasizing on the priority to address security 
issues. This paper focuses on the necessity of security needs in mobile ad-hoc networks when compared with the 
traditional wired networks. First we briefly discuss the basic characteristics of the mobile ad-hoc network, the 
convenience that these networks brought us. Next, we focus on some dangerous vulnerability in mobile ad-hoc 
networks caused by the characteristics of these networks such as mobility, changing topology, open media, limited 
battery power etc., and then stress on the need to find effective solutions to protect the mobile ad-hoc networks from 
external and internal security threats. Finally, we also discuss some aspects of intrusion detection techniques that can 
be further improved in future. 
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